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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
NO. 06-2667
________________
JAMES RILEY
v.
THOMAS CARROLL, DAVID PIERCE,
ANTHONY RENDINA, CAPTAIN McCREA, JAMES WATKINS,
MICHAEL TRADER, TODD DRACE, and JOHN DOES, of the 
Institutional Base Classification
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-00878)
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
____________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
September 28, 2006
BEFORE:  SLOVITER, McKEE and FISHER, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed  October 12, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant, James Riley, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s order
dismissing his civil rights complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)
The record indicates that Riley did receive notice of the charges against him and a1
hearing before a disciplinary officer.  The record indicates that Riley was present and
sanctions were imposed at the hearing on June 29, 2005.  (Appellant’s motion for
reconsideration at Exhibits A-D).  Accordingly, any allegations of false reports could
have been presented before the disciplinary hearing officer.
2
and the District Court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration of that order.  For the
reasons that follow, we will dismiss this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B).
Riley alleges that on June 17, 2005, he was moved to disciplinary segregation
based on the false reports of Trader, Drace, Watkins, and McCrea.  Riley alleges that he
later was transferred to administrative segregation due to a pending internal affairs
investigation, and that he has been housed since then in administrative segregation
without the benefit of a disciplinary hearing and due process.   Riley asserts that1
administrative segregation and disciplinary segregation are essentially identical in
location and privileges, and that recently the time period for review of inmates housed in
administrative segregation was increased from a 90 day review period to a 365 day review
period.  He claims this change violates his due process rights.
The District Court dismissed Riley’s complaint as legally and factually frivolous
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).  Riley appealed.  He
also filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the District Court.  Riley
filed an amended notice of appeal challenging that order.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because Riley
has been granted in forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we review this
3appeal for possible dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  An appeal may be
dismissed if it has no arguable basis in law or fact.  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325 (1989).
To succeed on a due process claim, Riley must first demonstrate that he was
deprived of a liberty interest.  Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 2002). 
Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause or from a state-created liberty
interest.  Id.  The Due Process Clause does not subject an inmate’s treatment by prison
authorities to judicial oversight as long as the degree of confinement or conditions to
which the inmate is subjected are within the sentence imposed and do not otherwise
violate the Constitution.  Id. (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)).  Because
administrative segregation is the sort of confinement that Riley should reasonably
anticipate receiving at some point in his incarceration, his transfer to less amenable and
more restrictive quarters does not implicate a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause.  Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2002).
Under certain circumstances, states may create liberty interests that are protected
by the Due Process Clause.  Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).  “But these
interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding
the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due
Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on
Riley filed his notice of appeal in April 2006, ten months after his transfer to2
administrative segregation.  Accordingly, even if we were to include in our consideration
the time period Riley spent in administrative custody prior to the filing of his notice of
appeal, it would still be insufficient to demonstrate the deprivation of a liberty interest.
4
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”  Id.  Generally, placement
in administrative segregation will not create a liberty interest.  Torres, 292 F.3d at 150.
Neither Delaware law nor the Delaware Department of Corrections regulations
create a liberty interest in a prisoner’s classification within an institution.  See Carrigan v.
State of Delaware, 957 F. Supp. 1376, 1385 (D.Del. 1997) (“[T]he State of Delaware has
created no constitutionally protected interest in a prisoner’s classification.”); Blizzard v.
Watson, 892 F. Supp. 587, 597 (D.Del. 1995) (“[P]rison officials may reclassify or
transfer a prisoner from the general population to the ASDA [Administrative Segregation
and Detention Area] for any reason or no reason at all.”); 11 Del.C. §6529(e); 11 Del.C.
§ 6535.  Furthermore, in Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997), we held
that administrative custody for periods as long as fifteen months is not an atypical and
significant hardship.  Riley was transferred to administrative segregation in June 2005. 
At the time that he filed his complaint, Riley had been in administrative segregation for
approximately six months; accordingly, Riley’s placement in administrative segregation is
not an atypical or a significant hardship that would deprive him of a liberty interest.  2
Griffin, 112 F.3d at 708.
5Riley also asserts that the policy of reviewing an inmate’s status in administrative
segregation once every 365 days violates his due process rights.  Because we have held
that administrative custody for fifteen months is not an atypical and significant hardship
and because a periodic status review once every 365 days falls within that parameter, we
are not persuaded that the policy of reviewing an inmate’s status once a year constitutes a
deprivation of a liberty interest.  See Griffin, 112 F.3d at 708.  Moreover, Riley received a
status review on September 27, 2005, three months after he was placed in administrative
segregation.  Appellant’s Complaint at Exhibit G-5.
Based on the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Riley’s appeal has no arguable
basis in law.  Accordingly, it will be dismissed pursuant to  28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
Riley’s motion for counsel and motion to expand the record are denied.
